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Reflections on Equality, Value and Paradox 
 
By Saul Smilansky 
 
I consider two difficulties which have been presented to egalitarianism: Parfit’s 
“Levelling Down Objection” (LDO) and my “Paradox of the Baseline” (POB). 
I show that making things worse for some people even with no gain to anyone 
is actually an ordinary and indeed necessary feature of our moral practice, yet 
nevertheless the LDO maintains its power in the egalitarian context. I claim 
that what makes the LDO particularly forceful in the case against egalitarianism 
is not the very idea of making some people worse off with no gain to others, 
but the disrespect for (non-egalitarian) value inherent in egalitarianism; and 
similarly that the POB is a reductio of choice (or luck)-egalitarianism because of 
its inversion of the intuitively correct attitude to the generation of value. I 
conclude that in the light of the absurdity and paradox so frequently lurking in 
moral and social life, and particularly with the complexity of modern life and 
obliquity of change, we need to be much more modest than egalitarians have 
been in putting forth ambitious moral and social models.  
 
 
When they were young, my parents joined a kibbutz in the north of Israel. They did not 
stay there much longer than a year. As my mother told the story, she wanted to remain, 
but my father was too much of an individualist. Yet even for her the egalitarianism was 
often excessive. One of our family stories tells of a night when my mother was on guard 
duty. Suddenly she began hearing banging noises at a distance. Following the sounds to 
the kitchen of the kibbutz, she found herself staring at one of the more fanatical men in 
the commune, sitting with a hammer in his hand. He had placed all of the collective’s 
dozens of cups on a table, and he was systematically lifting them, one after the other, and 
knocking off their handles. To my mother’s horrified question, he replied quietly that a 
few cups had lost their handles, and so, in order to assure continuing equality among all 
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the members of the kibbutz, it was necessary that no one should have a cup with a 
handle.  
 
Revisiting the Levelling Down Objection 
Derek Parfit would call this tale an instance of the “Levelling Down Objection” (LDO) 
(1998). If equality is a major value in itself, then knocking off the handles of all the 
kibbutz’s cups makes sense; but since making cups handle-less is manifestly absurd, the 
example (one of many possible ones, of course) discredits egalitarianism. The LDO has 
been a very influential objection against egalitarianism. The idea of making some people 
worse off merely for the sake of equality, even though no one benefits, is widely 
considered to be a reductio of egalitarianism.1 But some egalitarians seem willing to accept a 
limited amount of levelling down, and so they are willing to swallow the objection in 
certain cases. Typical is Jonathan Wolff: “Sometimes, then, we should level down. But I 
have only suggested that this is relevant when there are symbolic factors at play, which 
send messages of deep political inequality. This is not the politics of envy, or a cancer that 
will spread to allow all sorts of levelling down. Thus I would provisionally conclude that 
levelling down can be reasonable in a very special sort of case. Those sympathetic to 
equality should not be ashamed of this” (Wolff, 2001.) The widespread agreement that the 
LDO is a big problem for egalitarianism nevertheless echoes Wolff's apologetic tone. 
 The standard thinking here might be a bit too quick. Levelling down has two 
aspects: (a) making things worse for some people at no gain to anyone; and (b) doing so 
for the sake of equality. But large portions of commonsense morality countenance making 
things worse for some people even with no gain to anyone. This purportedly unique 
Achilles’ heel of egalitarianism as initially construed turns out to be an ordinary and 
indeed necessary feature of our moral practice, as the following common examples show: 
 
 a. A temporary power shortage in a city of millions of inhabitants makes it 
imperative that the vast majority of them conserve electricity by refraining from 
switching on their air conditioners. If most people continue to use their air 
conditioners at peak hours, the electric grid will collapse, to everyone's detriment. 
Given the anticipated levels of usage, however, it is certain that the threshold 
consumption that triggers a collapse will not in fact be approached (and in any 
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case the usage of persons A, B, and C is too negligible to collapse the system). 
Whether A, B, and C will turn on their air conditioners, therefore, will have no 
effect on the functioning of the electric grid. Not using their air conditioners will 
make them extremely uncomfortable, and will bring no benefit to anyone.  
 
b. Your country is at war, and there is a shortage of drinking water and food. You 
and your family, however, live on a small island off the mainland, and your house 
is just out of sight of the nearest beach. A stream crosses your land, and your 
numerous sheep graze on the nearby hill. Due to the war, all boats were 
confiscated, and hence it is impossible to send water or food over to the 
mainland. You have a beautiful flower garden you would like to continue to 
maintain, and you are planning a splendid feast. Not to water the garden or hold 
the feast would be worse for you and your family, and would benefit no one.  
 
c. You are a police officer responsible for keeping safe the objects that prisoners 
must relinquish, and also those that belong to people who are hospitalized after 
car accidents. Yesterday you received the purse of a woman who died in a car 
accident. Her two children, aged 9 and 12 years, were her passengers in the car, 
but they were unharmed except for temporarily losing consciousness. You are 
told that this is a particular tragedy, because the children’s beloved father had died 
from cancer two years ago. Going through the woman’s purse, as is your duty, 
you find a page, which you read (looking for clues as to her medical condition). 
You learn the woman’s secrets: she had not loved her husband (the children’s 
father), who had repeatedly cheated on her, and she is sorry she had borne any 
children. The children, who are due to be released from the hospital tomorrow, 
and are unaware of these matters, will come to your office to pick up their 
mother’s purse. If you give them the page, much pain will accrue to them, and no 
good will ensue to anybody.  
 
Each of the three situations exemplifies a different type of moral position. The first seems 
to be based on contractual intuitions; the second, on virtue-ethical ones; while the third is 
primarily deontological. However we denominate these positions, we do insist that A, B, 
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and C cease using air conditioners during the specified hours. While the wartime island-
dwellers cannot be expected to drink and eat only at the level of poverty then prevailing 
on the mainland, their continuing to nurture their water-intensive project of growing 
flowers, and their having a grand culinary feast, seem morally inappropriate. The police 
officer ought to do his duty and not sequester the mother’s loose page. Perhaps not 
everyone shares my intuitions on all three cases, but I believe that most people share 
some of them. And even those who differ from me on all three examples would surely 
not think my moral judgment preposterous. 
 The very ordinariness of such consensus, however, has significant implications for 
Parfit’s LDO. It would indeed be morally unfair that A, B, and C benefit while all the rest 
of us do not. Yet it would be similarly unfair for some kibbutzniks to have a handle with 
which to hold their cups while others will have to make do without handles. Following 
the constraints on using air conditioning meets the conditions of levelling down: it makes 
things worse for A, B, and C, and better for no one; yet we insist that they not use their 
cooling equipment. We probably also think that the islanders ought to delay their feast 
and restrain their gardening, and that the policeman ought to give their mother’s papers to 
the children, although in both these cases as well matters will, as a result, be better for no 
one, and worse for some. (The third example does not involve equality, but makes things 
worse for some and good for no one.) Seemingly unaware that we are “levelling down”, 
we habitually agree to make things worse for some and good for no one.  
 If my argument is convincing, we have taken egalitarianism out of the unpleasant 
corner in which it has found itself. For it turns out that there is nothing unique or even 
outstanding about the levelling-down tendencies of radical egalitarianism; we all do it. 
When Parfit asks whether it is not absurd to harm some at no benefit to anyone merely 
for the sake of equality, we can reply that levelling down in itself is not unacceptable. 
Something else, other than the mere fact of levelling down, would seem to be implicitly at 
work in cases of levelling down that we find unacceptable. Hence, the “obviousness” of 
Parfit’s objection against egalitarianism is placed in doubt. 
 This, then, is the interim puzzle about the Levelling Down Objection: if levelling down is, 
in itself, so manifestly objectionable (as many of the anti-egalitarian examples show), then 
how to account for the fact that we level down a great deal of the time, and do so 
reasonably? By the same token, if our morality enables us to level down, then why is the 
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LDO so persuasive? How can levelling down be both a radical monstrosity and a 
reasonable commonplace? And what makes the LDO so persuasive in the egalitarian 
context?  
 
Choice-egalitarianism and the Paradox of the Baseline 
I have proposed (Smilansky, 2003; revised and reprinted in Smilansky, 2007) an argument 
against another strand of egalitarianism. Unlike previous egalitarian positions, choice-
egalitarianism (or luck-egalitarianism, as it is commonly called) gives free choice a pivotal 
role by taking proper account of the role of choice and responsibility in moral 
justification. A person who requires more social resources because he freely makes 
himself dependent on an unequal share of such resources cannot demand of others that 
they finance his choice. If he develops a taste for expensive wines others need not finance 
this; and if he repeatedly lends his resources to risky business enterprises others need not 
pick up the tab when his gambles fail. Let us return for a minute to the handle-less cups. 
It does indeed seem to be less bad, even in terms of equality, if the handle of your cup is 
broken because you played catch with it, and the handle broke when the cup fell to the 
ground. It does not therefore seem fair that others should sacrifice the handles of their 
cups for your sake. Hence, choice-egalitarianism seems at one and the same time to be 
firmly egalitarian and to be able to avoid the charge of levelling down. In contrast, simple 
egalitarianism in this instance would be particularly outrageous: the only way it can 
compensate the grossly irresponsible for their own irresponsibility is to require levelling 
down at the expense of those behaving responsibly. Because of the role choice-
egalitarianism allows for choice, incentives, free decision, and responsibility, this position 
also seems more compatible with a market economy and a society that enables individual 
self-development through open and diverse choices.  
  In egalitarianism, the normative baseline is equality. We can evaluate equality 
and inequality in terms of many factors: income, the existence of certain goods, well-
being, and so on. Whatever factor we are evaluating, egalitarianism holds that the 
baseline is equality: our evaluation begins with the normative assumption that 
everyone should receive the baseline, unless we can justify the person’s not receiving 
it. Divergence from this baseline requires justification. Justice is comparative among 
persons, for we compare people in the relevant respects, and inequality between them 
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needs to be justified. Choice-egalitarianism adds that the only acceptable justification 
for any inequality, for any person’s having (receiving) less than others, is that the 
person has freely chosen it. (On choice-egalitarianism, see Cohen, 1989; Arneson, 
1989, but see Arneson, 2000; Rakowski, 1991; Temkin, 1993. On the way in which the 
notion of the baseline operates in these contexts, see Smilansky, 1996a,b.) 
 The basic ethical idea of choice-egalitarianism is, more precisely, this: if a is 
worse off than b in terms of factor F, choice-egalitarianism requires that a had an opportunity to be 
as well off as b in factor F, so that a is not as well off solely because of a’s free choices.  
Consider income. What is the normative baseline for evaluating inequalities, 
according to choice-egalitarianism? A first approximation is: the highest income that 
anyone possesses. Whatever this Highest Income may be, choice-egalitarianism holds 
that everyone ought to have an identical income, unless a given person’s free choice 
led him or her to attain less.3 For example, if at the end of the month one has less 
over-time pay because one decided to maximize one’s leisure and not work over-time, 
then the ensuing inequality is perfectly justified (through one’s choices), according to 
choice-egalitarianism.  
 But consider now the group of people who, however positive their motivation 
and however constant their efforts, they will not be able to gain most types of the 
goods that we have called ‘factors’. They may, for instance, be so severely disabled 
that no one within a market economy that pursues self-interest has the slightest 
incentive to hire their services. Under capitalism, therefore, these people cannot 
generate any sort of income. Call these people Non-Effectives. According to choice-
egalitarianism, Non-Effectives ought to get the baseline of Highest Income, since the 
basic moral implication of choice-egalitarianism is that no one may have a higher income 
than Non-Effectives. For if anyone’s income is higher, this inequality cannot be justified 
since it was not by the free choices of Non-Effectives that they are worse off. Hence, 
for choice-egalitarianism, the social order in terms of income (or resources, or well-
being, or whichever factors are to be equal under choice-egalitarianism) will find Non-
Effectives at the top, permanently and unconditionally “stuck” at the baseline. People 
who are Effectives, that is, who are not Non-Effectives, will have progressively less 
and less income, according to the extent to which they fall short of Highest Income 
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(or of Highest Potential Income) by freely choosing to work less, or by choosing not 
to develop their income-enhancing abilities further, or by their other free choices.  
Here, then, is the Paradox of the Baseline. For choice-egalitarianism, Non-
Effectives must necessarily be at the baseline of Highest Income (or even Highest 
Potential Income), while Effectives are very likely to fall much below the baseline in 
spite of their lifelong efforts and contributions. Choice-egalitarianism indexes every 
Non-Effective to the person who has the highest income, whom we can call Bill 
Gates (or even to what his income would be were he to meet his maximal earnings 
potential), while normally hard-working people are very unlikely to come even close. 
This means that choice-egalitarianism cannot give Non-Effectives what it must (by its 
own tenets), and at the same time do comparative justice to hard-working Effectives. 
 This consequence ought to trouble egalitarians, even irrespective of the 
question of how it affects the issue of whether their position may remain attractive to 
others. The obligation to position the Non-Effectives as high as Bill Gates cannot be 
reconciled with the moral need to maintain a reasonable relation between the 
positions of Non-Effectives and Effectives. These two requirements are 
contradictory. Moreover, choice-egalitarianism “penalizes” the human ability to make 
choices, for it leads to the conclusion that those who are in a position to make choices 
that could enhance their incomes and their opportunities for contributing to the well-
being of others are very likely to fall well below the level that those who cannot make 
such choices are unconditionally qualified to occupy. The hard-working Effectives are 
those who will finance the opulent life style of the unemployable Non-Effectives, 
whose income and resources will be indexed to those of Bill Gates. 
This conclusion is both absurd and morally repugnant. The prospect that it or 
any comparable view might be applied to a free and modern society becomes 
impossible to entertain.  
Two replies to the paradox may seem to be available. First, perhaps choice-
egalitarianism need not use a ‘top’-baseline. Why not, for instance, use a ‘middle’-
baseline? This might amount to a certain decent level of income or resources at which 
all citizens could function. By their free choice (say, by deciding not to work), some 
people would forfeit that level, or they could reach above it (say, by working extra 
hours). Persons with egalitarian sensibilities would find many attractions in a social 
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order with such a ‘middle’-baseline, among them that the income and resources of 
Effectives would depend on their choices, while the income and resources of Non-
Effectives (who cannot fall below the baseline because they are unable to work) 
would be at the fairly high baseline despite their condition. 
But this ‘middle’-baseline proposal is inadequate. From the choice-egalitarian 
perspective, any person’s being less well off than any other in terms of the pertinent 
factor can be in that circumstance only through that first person’s free choice. But this 
manifestly will not be the case in a ‘middle’-baseline world, because here some people 
will be significantly better off than the Non-Effectives, while the Non-Effectives will 
not have been able to choose to reach that much higher level. Hence only a ‘top’-
baseline does justice to the deep intuitions of choice- egalitarianism.4  
The second possible reply is to perhaps admit the Paradox but attempt to 
defuse it by claiming that choice-egalitarianism does not claim to be a complete 
account of how a society should arrange its social and economic affairs. This is a 
sensible move, and choice-egalitarians have indeed limited the range of their proposal 
in this way. However, it will not do as a way of confronting the Paradox of the 
Baseline any more than it does in its attempt to dismiss the LDO. The paradox does 
not threaten some marginal feature of the choice-egalitarian structure, or some feature 
that emerges only in the extremes of fully implementing choice-egalitarianism within 
social policy. On the contrary, the Paradox of the Baseline poses a fundamental threat 
because it follows from the basic ethical structure of choice-egalitarianism, and it 
therefore concerns any social order that is based on that version of egalitarianism.  
Parfit’s Levelling Down Objection and my Paradox of the Baseline show the 
dubiousness of egalitarianism, although they do so in different ways. In the LDO, 
egalitarianism seems obliged to level down: equality is achieved, but at a price that is at 
best grotesque and - when matters become serious - terrible. In the Paradox of the 
Baseline, egalitarianism seems to level up (a certain group): it creates a particularly odd 
sort of inequality, and a ridiculous situation. But however they differ, both arguments 
show that egalitarianism is unacceptable. Even if my skeptical defense of “levelling 
down” works to some extent, the obligation to level down for egalitarian reasons 
frequently makes egalitarianism intuitively unacceptable. 
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We need to examine why the traditional LDO is so intuitively effective against 
egalitarianism even while equivalent practices are widespread in commonsense 
morality (as in the three cases we examined). Yet even that perplexing outcome does 
not lead us to doubt that the LDO is a serious objection to egalitarianism. The 
Paradox of the Baseline is also a reductio of (a prominent version of) egalitarianism. 
That a responsibility condition needs to be added to egalitarianism – a proposal that is 
prima facie plausible – turns out to be deeply self-destructive. Both the LDO and the 
Paradox point to deep problems with egalitarianism. I want now to investigate these 
problems.  
 
The first lesson: the destruction of value 
The first problem has to do with value. In considering the tension between equality 
and what sorts of things human beings consider valuable, let us assume that most 
people have a rough and not radically dissimilar understanding of what value is: such 
things as happiness, freedom, health, beauty, and knowledge. Although equality itself 
may also be considered a value (to decide otherwise would prejudge the issue), when I 
speak here of value I will refer to these other values. This stipulation lets us to 
consider the contrast between them and equality.  
 The LDO is a forceful objection, in my opinion, because it shows that 
egalitarianism is, by its very logic, problematically related to value: doing things simply 
in order to equalize everyone cannot take value into consideration; it is a different sort 
of concern, and easily becomes antithetical to value. Some people will be made to 
have considerably less happiness, freedom, health, beauty, and so on, just because 
other people cannot attain a similar level for themselves. In the Paradox of the 
Baseline, egalitarianism is likewise objectionable because it so strikingly disconnects 
value and the production of value from the level at which different people end up 
economically and socially. For the Non-Effectives who produce no value at all end up 
at the top, at the expense of the hard-working Effectives who, in spite of their 
productivity, end up at the bottom – and stuck with the responsibility to keep the 
NEs at a fabulous level of wealth. Both the LDO and the Paradox point to a (perhaps 
the) major problem with egalitarianism: its dismissive relationship to value.  
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 Briefly considering the Value-Focused Society (VFS), a different social order that 
takes the production of value particularly seriously, can make this evident. This social 
order’s focus on creating value does not mean that broadly egalitarian matters will be 
of no concern. Equality in voting rights and equality before the law will undoubtedly 
be strictly adhered to in order to enlist widespread support for the value-oriented 
arrangements. Moreover, because talents are spread erratically in populations, a value-
oriented society will wish to find and benefit from those who have the greatest 
potential to produce value, whatever their social background. And even beyond the 
need for particular talents, a value-oriented modern society will require an educated, 
motivated workforce. For these reasons, broadly egalitarian practices (a social welfare 
net, opportunity for social mobility, some investment in all segments of the 
population) will be necessary.  
The distinctiveness of a VFS society will be the high level of its effort to 
motivate its members to create value. Successful contributors will be strongly praised 
and rewarded. The understanding of the notion of the morally good itself will come 
closer to that of “a contributor to value”. The culture will not emphasize those 
measures in which all people are equal whatever they do (or indeed whether they do 
anything or nothing). It will instead emphasize areas in which some people can 
become far more valuable – because they contribute so much more. And questions as 
to whether someone who has a native talent or an unusual social background has 
made great contributions with the help of that element, or whether others could have 
also made such contributions, will become much more subdued than they are today. 
In other words, social practices and reactions will closely track the concern with value 
and its production, while being fairly dismissive of questions related to equality and 
the need to justify inequality. 
 This is not the place to consider whether a VFS is to be preferred to what are 
in most ways the much more egalitarian societies of contemporary modern 
democracies. But through reflecting about such a sketch of a VFS we see at once that, 
on a spectrum of societies, it lies at the opposite end from a society bent on levelling 
down, with our societies located somewhere in the middle. This exercise helps us to 
see that what primarily troubles us about levelling down is the loss of value. The three 
examples of the ways we commonly “level down” almost without realizing and 
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without being troubled by our doing so are not instances of significantly harming 
value. They display circumstances in which some people are made worse off without 
benefiting anyone. Even so, some positive moral purpose is served without great loss 
of value (in at least the examples of the island dwellers and the users of air 
conditioners), and hence we approve or accept them. It is unfair that some people 
continue to enjoy the pleasures of air conditioning while benefiting from the 
abstinence of others; it is unvirtuous to enjoy feasts while others in one’s society are 
hungry under wartime conditions; and it seems wrong for a police officer to withhold 
a deceased mother's papers from her children. The wrongness in these cases is not 
fundamentally (or even at all) about inequality as such; they are distinctly moral 
arguments of different kinds. A case such as that of the handle-basher, by contrast, 
essentially places equality in opposition to value (of aesthetics and of pleasure in life), 
and to that person no other moral concern applies. In more serious examples, such as 
withholding medical treatment from some people just because there is not enough of 
it to help everyone, levelling down seems similarly counterintuitive. By the moral 
lights of most people, equality by itself cannot carry the intuitive burden. It cannot 
justify such a significant loss of value.  
A similar conclusion follows from the Paradox of the Baseline. The idea that, 
for the sake of some egalitarian theory, hard-working producers of value will support 
nonworking Non-Effectives in a life of opulent ease is unacceptable. It is true that the 
Non-Effectives are not at fault for their disabilities, and that hence they do not 
deserve to have less than anyone else. But their misfortune is insufficient to justify 
social arrangements that are so harmful to and disrespectful of value, and that run so 
strikingly counter to a morality that takes into account producing value. It seems to 
me, then, that the force of the LDO and the Paradox of the Baseline primarily lies 
with the idea that value, beyond egalitarianism, matters a great deal, and the attitudes 
and rewards that people receive cannot be too radically divorced from the role that 
persons play in producing value. These ideas, it seems to me, are responsible for the 
force the LDO and the Paradox of the Baseline exert against egalitarianism. 
 When considering egalitarianism, philosophers habitually make concessions 
unnecessarily, and we limit the scope of our attention. If a man’s parents did not love 
him, they thereby hand him an enormous problem that stunts his emotional 
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development, affecting his life negatively beyond all comparison to many other 
disadvantages. Yet even convinced egalitarians are not inclined to allocate resources 
so that the best therapists can be hired in order to help such a man for as long as he 
might need them. Philosophers typically exclude the strictly personal sphere from 
their egalitarian concerns. And yet if we did not, levelling down here could lead to 
disallowing other persons to associate with their own parents until every person with 
unloving parents has been treated and has recovered emotionally. Likewise, since few 
things matter more to most people than loving someone and being loved, we might 
also be led to allocating and switching partners by some egalitarian mechanism, 
evening things out so that no one ends up spending a whole life with his or her 
beloved while others without beloveds remain deprived. Just so, we would fall ever 
more swiftly into the fatal jaws of the Levelling Down Objection. Love, 
companionship, marriage, and family life are major sources of value, and to sacrifice 
them for the sake of equality is ludicrous.  
The Paradox of the Baseline leads egalitarianism to similar absurdity. If 
happiness or honor are the factors to be equalized, then, according to choice-
egalitarianism, no one may be allowed to be happier than the greatest depressive, nor 
may anyone be honored more than the least respected person, whatever his or her 
achievements or contributions, unless the depressives or disrespected persons have 
freely made themselves so (see also Smilansky, 1995).5  
 
The second lesson: complexity, change, and the need for modesty 
Our situations as social beings are immensely complicated, and they are frequently in 
flux. Handles will fall off mugs, medical resources that can serve only some of the 
potential beneficiaries will become available, and the “working class” will shrink. At 
every level, change soon makes our habits, predictions, and expectations outdated. 
The strict egalitarianism of the handle-basher is not the sophisticated choice-
egalitarianism of contemporary philosophers and social theorists, but every such 
ideology and theory will in time fail. It will run afoul of change, or it will too radically 
destroy value, or it will be entangled in its own paradoxes – indeed, probably all three. 
 We need to modify our moral theories and social constructions, molding them 
to serve the often erratic series of changes. Moral systems that greatly harm the 
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enlargement of value, or that cannot accommodate radical change, will wither away, 
but they will probably also cause much damage before they do so. Moreover, the 
evolutionary perspective has been radically shortened: within our lifetime, radical 
changes in human nature itself will become possible for the first time in history. 
Transhuman, subhuman, and nonhuman beings (robots) will soon transform our 
societies, including the ways we think about value, human rights, and equality. Such 
extreme technological changes are likely to generate new paradoxes.  
 So the upshot of this second lesson, which is also indirectly about value, is not 
that Karl Marx got the questions of economic motivation and information 
spectacularly wrong (although he did); or that John Rawls made glaring mistakes in his 
estimate of the results of the veil of ignorance (which he did); or that choice-
egalitarians did not foresee the implications of the mixture of egalitarianism and 
choice (they did not). The lesson is not that here or there a mistake has been made, 
but that some other, nonegalitarian, grand theory is correct, but that we need to be 
skeptical about the quest for a grand theory as such. Levelling Down societies have 
been tried, and they led to Mao’s cultural revolution and to Pol Pot. Choice-
egalitarianism has yet to be tried in such a broad and systematic way, but the Paradox 
of the Baseline shows its inherent potential for generating similar social dementia.  
 Others before me have argued for broadly similar conclusions. Mine are not 
fundamentally different from those taught, in different ways and in different 
disciplines, by Frederick Hayek, Karl Popper, and Isaiah Berlin, to name but three of 
the more prominent thinkers. Well-meaning intellectuals seem particularly tempted to 
devise grand theories, and so every generation needs to learn anew some crucial 
lessons in modesty. Paradoxes are particularly effective teachers. It is telling that moral 
paradoxes have been so largely neglected, unlike in other parts of philosophy.6 There 
is possibility for rational understanding, and room for social improvement, but when 
pursuing them we must think critically and skeptically, and step gingerly. Absurdity 
and paradox wait to ambush us as we make our philosophical turns in moral and 







Arneson, Richard (1989). “Equality and equality of opportunity for welfare”, 
Philosophical Studies 56, 77-93. 
 
Arneson, Richard (2000). “Luck egalitarianism and prioritarianism”, Ethics 110, 339-
49. 
 
Cohen, G.A. (1989). “On the currency of egalitarian justice”, Ethics 99, 906-44. 
 
Kavka, Gregory S. (1987). Moral Paradoxes of Nuclear Deterrence. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
 
Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper (2004). “Smilansky’s baseline objection to choice-
egalitarianism”, SATS – Nordic Journal of Philosophy 5, 147-50. 
 
Manor, Tal (2005). “Inequality: mind the gap! A reply to Smilansky’s paradox of the 
baseline”, Analysis 65, 265-8. 
 
Parfit, Derek (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Parfit, Derek (1998). “Equality and priority.” In Mason, Andrew (ed.). Ideals of Equality. 
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.  
 
Räikkä, Juha (2014). Social Justice in Practice. Cham: Springer.  
 
Rakowski, Eric (1991). Equal Justice. Oxford: Clarendon. 
 
Rawls, John (2000). A Theory of Justice. Revised edition. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press.  
 
Smilansky, Saul (1995). “Nagel on the grounds for compensation”, Public Affairs 




Smilansky, Saul (1996a). “Responsibility and desert: defending the connection”, Mind 
105, 157-63. 
 
Smilansky, Saul (1996b). “The connection between responsibility and desert: the 
crucial distinction”, Mind 105, 385-6. 
 
Smilansky, Saul (1997). “Egalitarian justice and the importance of the free will 
problem”, Philosophia 25, 153-61.  
 
Smilansky, Saul (2003). “Choice-egalitarianism and the paradox of the baseline”, 
Analysis 63, 146-51.  
 
Smilansky, Saul (2004). “Reply to Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen on the paradox of the 
baseline”, SATS – Nordic Journal of Philosophy 5, 151-3. 
 
Smilansky, Saul (2005). “Choice-egalitarianism and the paradox of the baseline: A 
reply to Manor”, Analysis 265, 333-7. 
 
Smilansky, Saul (2007). 10 Moral Paradoxes. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.  
 
Temkin, Larry S. (1993). Inequality. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Wolff, Jonathan (2001). “Levelling down.” In Dowding, K., Hughes, J. and Margetts, H. 
(eds.). Challenges to Democracy: The PSA Yearbook. London: Macmillan. 
 
Notes 
1. The LDO gains much of its force from the egalitarian tenet that some persons will be deprived by 
others of goods or services, and is less persuasive when voluntary self-deprivation is involved. We might 
be able to see some potential attractiveness in a supererogatory ideal of choosing never to drink with a 
cup, not even with a handle-less cup (as Diogenes reportedly did). But requiring that everyone do so for 




2. A notable exception is Larry Temkin (1993), who argues against what he calls “The Slogan”, the idea 
that something cannot be good if it is not good for anyone. He claims that levelling down for the sake of 
equality can be morally better, in one sense, even though it is not better for anyone.  
 
3. Arguably the baseline is located even higher. For choice-egalitarianism, the baseline could perhaps be 
the earning level of the persons most able to earn high incomes if those persons were to decide to work 
as hard as they can at the position at which they could have the highest income. I call this Highest 
Potential Income. However, even Highest Income suffices to let the paradox be revealed. 
 
4.  But see Manor (2005) and my reply (2005). 
  
5. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2004) indeed attempts to defuse my challenge by focusing on well-being 
rather than on income or resources. He does so because perhaps no one is strictly “non-effective” in his 
or her capacity for well-being.  But taking this direction would make matters worse overall for the 
egalitarian, since the need for compensation would then not stop with income (even with equalizing Bill 
Gates’s income!). Better for the egalitarian that we think about these matters in terms of the standard 
factors such as income and resources (Smilansky, 2004). 
 
6. The importance of paradoxes in epistemology, logic, metaphysics, and philosophy of science is 
manifest, with hundreds of books and papers available, and more appearing regularly. While many 
survey articles, special issues of journals, and numerous collections of papers are devoted to paradox 
in these areas, and often to individual paradoxes, to the best of my knowledge only three academic 
books on moral paradoxes have appeared in English: Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons (1984), the 
late Gregory Kavka's book on paradoxes of nuclear deterrence (1987), and my 10 Moral Paradoxes 
(2007). 
 
7. We must not, however, lose sight of the benefits of theorizing and of idealism: one of the 
contributions made by Juha Räikkä to our contemporary understanding of moral and social 
problems is the way he has showed how we are frequently (as with the idea of the “second-best”, or 
with Sidgwick’s “dilemma of conservative justice”) too quick to see difficulties and think that we 
should compromise our theories and ideals (Räikkä, 2014). 
